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There is a famous phrase by Charles Tilly 
which reads that states make war and war 
makes states, but why is that war-like empires 
such as the Mughal Empire, the Ming-Qing 
Empire, and the Ottoman Empire did not 
create developmental states, and why was 
it that the British before the Spanish or the 
French or other European countries created 
developmental states?
Some countries have created and sustained 
the institutions which have made them cur-
rently amongst the richest in the world. But 
why they sustained and created these institu-
tions is because they had a mega-institution, 
mainly the state.  It is the state that ultimately 
creates and destroys or fails to create the ins-
titutions for growth.  What we actually need 
is an effi cient state that can be recognized 
retrospectively as one that provides an eco-
nomy with public goods, namely external se-
curity.  If you do not have external security, 
as per the Ukraine at the moment, you're not 
going to have economic growth.
Secondly, you need internal stability.  Nobo-
dy expects large parts of the Middle East to 
develop at the present time because they do 
not have the most precious of public goods: 
a stable regime.  Even a dictatorship, so long 
as it is stable, is very often good for growth. 
In fact, some dictatorships have been very 
good for growth.  So, it is these states that are 
required for the maintenance of institutions, 
for our laws, and our cultures that promote 
economic growth.  Lastly, the historical capa-
cities to act in creating external security and 
internal stability are highly correlated to their 
capacity for raising taxes, so taxation is a key 
element in the story of economic growth.
The concerns of pre-modern European states 
were not with economic development but 
with external security, internal stability and, 
above all, the Habsburg dynastic survival. In 
the particular case of Spain, they tried hard 
to centralize power in the context of political 
and geopolitical fi ghts. In Europe we have 
warlords, we have aristocrats, we have urban 
oligarchies, we have the Church, and we have 
rebellious peasants and disaffected proleta-
rians, and all these centrifugal forces which 
are now coming up again in Europe.
Until the 18th century, the economic gap bet-
ween most of Europe and large parts of Asia/
Eurasia, was rather minor. In these centur-
ies the technologies available to states for 
the gathering of information and the acting 
on information and knowledge about the 
countries, the regions, the peoples, the eth-
nic groups, and the religious minorities over 
which they ruled, were really rather primitive.
Sometimes democracies co-relate highly with 
economic growth, but very often, they do not. 
Sometimes a period is needed of a very strong 
leadership. You need a Hobbesian monarch 
or a Hobbesian ruler to get you on the path 
of economic growth. What historians have de-
cided to do in order to obtain some insights 
into this process is to compare states and how 
they developed in the West, within the West, 
and, lastly, between the Occident and the 
Orient. This, essentially, is the Marc Bloch's 
historical method. Marc Bloch advocated that 
Some countries have created and sustained the institutions
which have made them currently amongst the richest in the 
world. But why they sustained and created these institutions 
is because they had a mega-institution, mainly the state
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we did reciprocal comparative history, that 
we looked across Europe and we compared 
state formation in various parts of Europe.
We've come up with the possibly Euro-cen-
tered hypothesis that the fi rms, farms, invest-
ors, entrepreneurs and innovators operating 
within this war-like Europe that we all know 
about in the early modern period, were oper-
ating with an ideology for state formation, for 
mercantilist order that was, in the end, con-
ducive to more rapid growth compared with 
the great empires of Asia and other parts of 
the world.
But, how can we confront this 
hypothesis?
But, how can we confront this hypothesis, 
which goes way back in historiography?  It 
goes back, classically, to the writings of Max 
Weber, and which has already attracted a 
number of naïve answers from economists, 
including Acemoglu and Robinson. Following 
an approach developed by Schmoller and 
Schumpeter from the German Historical 
School, my approach has been to formulate 
hypotheses based on the vast bibliography of 
literature on state formation in the West, fi rst 
of all, to explain why Britain can be represen-
ted as the paradigm case for successful war-
fare and mercantilism, and offer a negotiable 
explanation as to why Europe's delayed and 
Asia's retarded transitions to industrial capi-
talist market economies took the time that 
they did.
After 23 years of warfare against Revolutio-
nary and Napoleonic France, the monarchy of 
Britain, along with its plutocratic and aristo-
cratic elites was in charge of governing the, 
by then, United Kingdom of England, Wales, 
Scotland, and Ireland which, by the way, it is 
about to break up again. We are offered su-
perior standards of external security, internal 
stability, protection of property rights, and 
support for a traditional authority of hierar-
chy, legal frameworks for the extension and 
integration of markets, encouragements for 
technical and business innovation, and, above 
all, more extensive and better protected ac-
cess to the markets in all parts of the world. 
The question, fi rst of all, is we need to un-
derstand why Britain got there fi rst, and it is 
because we had a strong, comparative advan-
tage in state formation and in violence, above 
all, in naval violence.
That was our strongest comparative advan-
tage, and that was mainly derived because as 
a result of the Civil War, when we cut off the 
head of our king Charles I in the middle of the 
17th century, for trying to raise taxes and cen-
tralize the state. But, it is not until we have a 
republic in the middle of the 17th century that 
we start to build a navy, that we start to build 
a real fi scal system, and we owe that not to 
our greatest sailor, but to our greatest soldier, 
Oliver Cromwell.  Under the Republic, the Bri-
tish Navy and the British tax system started 
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to reform itself, and Britain started to become 
the greatest power in the rise of the West.
Along with taxation goes the capacity to bo-
rrow money.  As many have discovered by 
being members of the European Union, it has 
much to do with our capacity to repay or not 
to repay money, as the case may be. People 
had extreme confi dence in the state, crea-
ted by the republicans and carried on by the 
monarchy and the aristocracy in the 18th cen-
tury, that they could lend it money, and mo-
ney fl owed into London, not merely from all 
over Britain, but from all over Europe. Taxes 
were used to fi ght wars, but 60 to 70 percent 
of all the taxes that were raised, which were 
amongst the highest in Europe per capita, 
were going to service debt, so Britain was bor-
rowing money, fi ghting a war, winning a war, 
and servicing its debt.
What were taxes also spent on?  They were 
spent on the Royal Navy founded by Oliver 
Cromwell and we invested massive amounts 
of money in naval power, an obvious thing to 
do for an island, although we were already de-
fended by the waters, as the Spanish Armada 
found out in 1588.
The British State and the British people 
thought their navy was very important, and 
the navy was extremely popular, and people 
were willing to support it.  At the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars, we had the greatest tonnage
of ships and we were in command of the 
ocean, and we remained in command of the 
ocean right through the 19th century, so British 
hegemony is fi rst and foremost a naval hege-
mony, derived from the creation of a fi scal 
state.
Some historians state that we had a suc-
cessful fi scal state because we were invaded 
by the Normans and the Normans were great 
centralizers, so there is a medieval origin in 
the creation of the modern state. But the defi -
ning moment was to withdraw from imperial 
warfare on the mainland of Europe in 1453. 
Britain stopped trying to take over the whole 
of France and the whole of Europe after hun-
dreds of years of warfare between British and 
French monarchs in that particular period.
Britain withdrew to the island, to internal co-
lonization over the Celtic fringes of the king-
dom, that were fi nally brought fi rmly into the 
kingdom. Compared with other powers on the 
mainland of Europe, particularly France, but 
also Spain, we did not play a really big part 
in the Reformation.  If compared with France 
or Spain or Portugal, or particu-
larly with the 30 years in Ger-
many, it is really a rather minor 
sort of event.  There is a change, 
the king becomes head of the 
Church and the Church becomes 
more secular. Over time, the 
Church of England has become 
steadily less and less religious.
Then, in the middle of the 17th 
century, we have our famous civil war, and 
that leads to a very sharp division. It is in that 
particular period, in which the navy is built 
up and Celtic threats to the stability of the 
kingdom from Ireland and from Scotland, are 
brutally suppressed by the Cromwell and the 
republic army, when the imposition of Pro-
testantism is then fi rmly established. Then, 
it followed a period of further reforms to the 
structure and administration of the fi scal sys-
Sometimes democracies co-relate 
highly with economic growth, 
but very often, they do not. 
Sometimes a period is needed of  
a very strong leadership
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tem, and a period of continued aggression, 
particularly against the Dutch, since they con-
trolled very large shares of world trade, they 
were clearly rich at doing so, they were colo-
nizing large parts of the world; and they were 
seen as the prime threat to Britain's drive for 
hegemony and stability.
Britain fought three wars against The Nether-
lands, and then it fought a war against France 
with The Netherlands on its side. But in the 
famous battles when the British Navy is sup-
posed to have showed up to help the Dutch 
beat the French, somehow or other the Bri-
tish Navy failed to show up.  The Dutch got 
extremely annoyed about that because they 
were then beaten by the French and ended 
up signing the Treaty of Utrecht with a much 
smaller navy and a much weaker power.  Bri-
tain is then ready to take their place in the 
world economy.
Mercantilism based on naval power
Britain then has a fi nancial revolution, creates 
a centralized national debt, and creates the 
Bank of England, what is a key element in its 
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success in mercantilism based on naval power.
This mercantilism was pursued by all Euro-
pean powers for many centuries. They re-
mained preoccupied with power compared 
with profi t. They were focused upon the gains 
from a positive balance of trade, and commit-
ted to maximizing the direct benefi ts and ex-
ternalities embodied in exports and strategic 
imports, particularly the kind of imports from 
Asia and from the Americas that you could 
actually make on the island: cottons from In-
dia, silks from China, all kinds of things that 
we were bringing in from the rest of the world. 
Raw materials were all refi ned at port, so the 
port becomes, in England, what Braudel called 
the pôles de croissance, the points of growth, 
which are brought in under naval protection 
from the rest of the world and copied by the 
English during their commercial revolution.
The mercantilists were right about bullion. 
They were often criticized with having a pre-
occupation with gold, and Spain is often cri-
ticized for having a pre-occupation with pre-
cious metals. But, if you want to go to war, 
you need precious metals.  You have to pay the 
troops so they do not mutiny, and you need to 
pay for your supplies, if you're abroad, with 
hard currency.  This leads to an expansion and 
an agglomeration of economic activity in ports 
all around the coast, as described in Braudel's 
works on capitalism and material life in the 
early modern period, and it is modeled by eco-
nomists latterly in their network technologies 
and gains for agglomeration. Organization is 
in many, many ways, as economists are begin-
ning to understand, best for growth.
The best place to have skilled labor, to inter-
act, to interconnect, to develop innovation, 
to develop science and technology is not in 
the countryside; it is in the cities. The bullion 
that you obtain will allow you to build up an 
effi cient system of fi nancial intermediation, a 
good banking system, a central bank that ac-
tually controls the money supply and helps to 
keep the money supply in line with the growth 
of the economy. Above all, it will give you 
raw materials and food stocks from overseas 
upon which programs of import substitution 
can actually be built. A lot of British indus-
trialization, famously the cotton industry, but 
also many industries are actually created on 
the basis of imported raw materials and im-
ported manufacturers, which were copied af-
ter having learned how to make them.
It was not a peaceful world though. Mer-
cantilism promoted costly bouts of warfare, 
which led to pressures for fi scal centrali-
zation to fund ever more expensive wars, 
which became ever more expensive as the 
Europeans went over to gunpowder weapons 
and fi rearms of various kinds before the rest 
of the world. It facilitated a system in which 
the best and the brightest, if they had an al-
ternative religion or they were persecuted 
in any way by the state, or they 
didn't feel at home, could actually 
move to a Protestant country or 
a Catholic country, or some other 
country, promoting what Alfred O. 
Hirschman called exit and voice. 
You had to hang on to these skilled 
people, you had to make conces-
sions to them; otherwise, they 
would leave. Skilled Europeans were mobile. 
They could always move about. It promoted 
proto-globalization, which was led by the Span-
ish and the Portuguese overseas, followed 
fi rst as free riders and pirates by the English, 
but eventually led by the English.
It led, after 1815, once we had fi nally beaten 
The British regime in the 19th 
century is ostensibly liberal 
but, socially and culturally, it 
is very hierarchical
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the French in the Second Hundred Years' 
War, to one hegemonic naval power. It is this 
hegemonic naval power, winning that battle 
at Trafalgar that really creates the conditions 
for the end of mercantilism and the begin-
nings of free trade, without one single navy 
commanding the oceans, preventing people 
re-colonizing the Americas, preventing the 
Spanish going back into North America, the 
French going there, carrying on with those 
colonial wars in the east.  That helped keep 
the peace. The statistics for warfare in the 
19th century drop dramatically, in terms of the 
number of countries involved, or the number 
of days of confl ict. The intensity of warfare, 
all the way to 1914, also dropped dramati-
cally, and this is because supplying troops 
overseas became a monopoly of the British, 
because they alone have the naval power to 
actually expand colonially, and to prevent 
other people expanding colonially.
Why was it that the leading rivals of England 
between 1650, between the republic and 1914, 
were so slow to adopt the fi scal, military, and 
other policies pursued by this island? Why 
does not this example of an early and preco-
cious transition to a modern, capitalist, indus-
Total Revenues Received by Central Governments
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part of its output to the rest of the world. But 
the real money to be made is not in industry, 
it is not in making things; it is to be a suc-
cessful middleman –a shipper, and, above all, 
in recent years, a banker. This is the way to 
make money, make real money.  That's what 
is meant by English gentlemanly capitalism. 
We are ruled by aristocrats, ruled by gentle-
men, and ruled by a plutocracy throughout 
the 19th century, although the 20th century 
would be different.
The rest of Europe is not able to create fi s-
cal systems of the same power and the same 
extractive capacity as Britain. The British are 
somewhat more democratic, there is more 
compliance with demands for taxes but, if you 
keep winning wars, of course you're going to 
pay taxes to win the wars.  If you get rather 
high rates and safe rates of interest from the 
government, you're going to lend money to 
governments who actually win wars.
On the mainland of Europe, there is conti-
nuous and persistent regional resistance, 
which is now re-emerging. Nobody likes 
the centralization and the universalization 
of taxes. It is bitterly resisted, so the central 
state is seen by large parts of Europe in much 
the same way as Britain sees Brussels at the 
present time: an extractor of revenues for no 
good reason. Secondly, the administration for 
taxes. If you look at the administrations on 
the mainland, a lot more taxes are collected 
than actually ever reach the capital city be-
cause it is siphoned off, it is corrupted away 
in various ways, or it deliberately has to be 
spent locally, as it happens in England regard-
ing Scotland.
But that sort of thing, the Scottish issue, is ab-
solutely commonplace throughout France for 
most of the 19th century.  It is also common-
place in Italy, and commonplace in very large 
parts of Europe where fi scal autonomies ac-
tually survive in various forms, so that there 
trial market power take hold in Europe, or 
take hold at the pace that it does?  Why does 
not it happen quicker in France, in Belgium, 
in Spain, or in Germany than it actually does? 
Britain had a number of advantages in rela-
tion to the rest of Europe. The rest of Euro-
peans have always found it much more diffi -
cult, no matter how absolutist their monarchs 
pretended to be, to actually consolidate their 
gains from sovereignty.  If you came to be ab-
solute and sovereign you had to legislate for 
a tax or decree that there will be a tax and it 
will be universally applied across the territory 
that you claim to rule. There were very few 
countries in Europe that could do that before 
the middle of the 19th century, countries that 
could widely tap into whatever fi scal resour-
ces actually available to them. They found it 
much more diffi cult for all kinds of reasons 
−because they had lost so many wars and 
they were plagued by internal instabilities of 
various kinds− to maintain stability.
The British regime in the 19th century is os-
tensibly liberal but, socially and culturally, it 
is very hierarchical. The vote is not extended 
until very late in the period, and the English 
are extremely deferential to their monarch 
and to their aristocracy. We have this navy, so 
that before the buildup of the German Navy 
at the end of the 19th century, we do not have 
to worry at all about external security. Above 
all, we make most of the gains that are to be 
made from servicing the transnational eco-
nomy.  Who was it who funds transnational 
trade, international trade, which is the great 
center for banking, insurance, shipping, cre-
dit, commercial profi teering in the 19th cen-
tury? Who are these gentlemen and the capi-
talists?
They come from all over Europe and they 
settled in London to make real money, some 
of which they invest in these industries in the 
north, and some of which they invest in the 
British service sector, which sells a very large 
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in centralizing command over their sovereign 
revenues much more effectively and much 
earlier than the bureaucracies in charge of 
the imperial systems of China, of India, of the 
Ottoman dominions. It seems that the German 
Historical School, who always had the state at 
the center of their explanations for economic 
growth, had a very big point to make, and that 
point is only now being realized even by the 
economics profession. 
is not a centralized fi scal state but a federa-
tion of fi scal units that are called a state.  This 
is not the most effi cient way to run a state. 
What the republican regime showed was that 
Britain possessed the political, after they had 
executed their king, the fi scal, the natural, 
and the other advantages required, and fi scal 
centralization comes very gradually to Euro- 
pe, so the 19th century story of Europe is the 
very slow construction in the wake of the 
Napoleonic Wars, which was a centralizing 
vent for most places in Europe, including 
Spain, of a fi scal system that is central and 
which provides the state with enough taxes 
so it can act positively to provide the pu-
blic goods and the markets, the framework 
of markets that is required for growth.
But why is it that great Oriental empires are so 
retarded economically for such a long time? 
The answer is that they do not manage, ever, 
to obtain anything like the access that we Eu-
ropeans have managed to obtain to taxation, 
so they do not ever have the same fi scal capa-
city as in Europe. Throughout most of the 18th 
century, with a population that is 20 times the 
size of Britain, the Chinese Ming-Qing regime 
collects less taxes than the British state.
On a per capita basis, the Chinese state, 
the Ottoman dominions, and, above all, the 
Mughal Empire collect pathetically small 
amounts of money. So, these vast empires 
look like states but they cannot provide 
neither social overhead capital nor defense. 
They do not have the resources.  Even though 
they know what needs to be done to catch 
up, both geopolitically and economically, 
they simply never manage to construct a fi s-
cal state.
Looking at these great empires, the amount 
of taxes that they are able to collect is really 
low by European standards, and particularly 
by British standards. One of the hypothesis is 
that Western states, led by Britain, succeeded 
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